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TWO MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD: A LOOK AT THE
UNCERTAIN STATUS OF NONBIOLOGICAL LESBIAN
MOTHERS UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Currently, state family law courts are embroiled in custodial
matters arising in the context of nontraditional family units. Courts
increasingly are being asked to address matters of custody, visi-
tation, and child support for a separating couple and their child,
when the child has a legally recognized biological connection to only
one of the parents. One particularly difficult situation to reconcile is
that of homosexual couples whose unions have resulted in children
but which have subsequently dissolved. Because of the unique make-
up of these families, the traditional legal model addressing custody
rights fails to adequately fashion remedies for them.' Nevertheless,
many states' courts rigidly adhere to the traditional model in order
to dispose of these couples' cases in a cursory manner.2 This state of
the law results in vicious consequences: "Parents create a nontradi-
tional family, [which] becomes the reality of the child's life .... The
courts should protect children's interests within the context of
nontraditional families, rather than attempt[ing] to eradicate such
families by adhering to a fictitious, homogenous family model."3
Other states, attempting to address the reality of these families,
struggle to create new legal models for the situation.4
This note explores the current legal theories implemented in
resolving questions of custodial rights and responsibilities in the
context of same-sex parents. It demonstrates that the traditional
model of resolving custody disputes insufficiently addresses the
reality of contemporary family units in a fair manner. It argues
instead that the newer models of functional parenthood more
appropriately addresses the situation of couples like the one in the
focus case explored herein.
Part I details the facts of the currently pending case involving
Janet and Lisa Miller-Jenkins, now immersed in a custody dispute
1. This idea is explored in this note through the consideration of a real nontraditional
family.
2. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text.
3. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,
482 (1990).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 108, 120, 145, 158 and accompanying text.
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over Lisa's biological daughter, Isabella.5 This case implicates
custodial rights and responsibilities for biological and nonbiological
parents, and it illustrates how those rights play out under different
states' laws dealing with the issue.6 In this case, the specific differ-
ences between Vermont law and Virginia law on the subject are
relevant. Thus, Part II discusses Vermont and Virginia law in this
area and the differences between them. Vermont law provides a
more promising remedy to the problem than current Virginia law;
however, many states' laws are not on par with Vermont and have
failed to incorporate alternatives to the traditional parental model.7
Part III therefore examines the various models and legal theories
that may be used to answer custody questions arising in cases
involving nonbiological parties seeking parental rights and com-
pares the traditional and nontraditional models. Parts II and III
also apply these various laws and models to the focus case demon-
strating how the various state laws and theories examined can lead
to different results. Part IV concludes the note. Taking all of the
factors of the focus case into account, this note argues that in cases
similar to the focus case the fairest result is achieved by using a
functional parent model rather than adhering to the traditional
model that allocates custody rights and responsibilities primarily,
if not solely, on the basis of the biological status of the party.
I. CONFLICTING LAWS, COMPETING RIGHTS:
THE MILLER-JENKINS CASE
In 2002, Isabella Miller-Jenkins was born in Virginia, as a
result of artificial insemination, to Lisa and Janet Miller-Jenkins.
The women, initially a couple in Virginia, moved to Vermont to
become a legally recognized couple under that state's civil union
laws.9 The couple then moved back to Virginia, where Isabella was
born, before eventually settling in Vermont.° The Miller-Jenkinses
lived as a legally recognized family unit under Vermont law,
comprised of two parents and their child, until Lisa sought a
5. Justin Bergman, Custody Fight May Test Va. Law, Mother of Child Seeks Sole Custody
After Civil Union to Woman Ends, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2004, at B2.
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 70, 76 and accompanying text.
8. Alan J. Keays, Civil Union Custody Fight: Woman Found in Contempt: Judge Scolds
Mom for Leaving for Another State, RUTLAND HERALD, Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.rutland
herald.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID/20040908/NEWS/409080397&S.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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dissolution of the civil union, again under Vermont law, in 2003."
The women agreed to adjudicate the custodial issues involving
Isabella in the same proceeding, also before a Vermont judge.'2
Under that decision, Janet received visitation rights to Isabella."
The decision comported with the couple's belief that, pursuant to
their civil union, Janet already had parental status with regard to
the child and did not need to legally adopt Isabella. 4 After all,
"Lisa Miller-Jenkins and Janet Miller-Jenkins might have expected
that their lives as a couple joined in civil union would enjoy the
same protections that married couples enjoy. That was the explicit
purpose behind the creation of civil unions."'5
When Lisa returned to Virginia after these proceedings, she
took Isabella with her and sought full custody under Virginia law, 6
which prohibits gay marriage 7 and civil unions" and voids such
marriages or unions from other states. 9 The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution, however, provides that
each state give full recognition to the public acts and records of
every other State.2" The original purpose behind the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was to "guard ... against the disintegrating influence
of provincialism."'" Because the Miller-Jenkinses' civil union was a
matter of public record, the Constitution seemingly would require
Virginia to acknowledge the civil union and Janet's parental rights as
established under Vermont Law. To the contrary, however, states are
not required to honor out-of-state civil unions or marriages if doing so
would conflict with state public policy.22 The Supreme Court noted in
1998 that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
11. Calvin R. Trice, Judge Rules That Va. Law Voids Issue of Custody for Gays, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2004, at Al.
12. Keays, supra note 8.
13. Trice, supra note 11.
14. Bergman, supra note 5.
15. A Question of Dignity, RUTLAND HERALD, Aug. 26, 2004, http://www.rutlandherald.
com/apps/pbcs.dlYarticle?AID=/20040826/NEWS/408260321&S.
16. Trice, supra note 11.
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-45.2 (2004).
18. Id. § 20-45.3.
19. Id. § 20-45.2-45.3.
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
21. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUJM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945).
22. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (distinguishing law of
another jurisdiction from judgments rendered in another jurisdiction and explaining that, in
applying law from another jurisdiction, courts may invoke a "public policy" exception).
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with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."'23
Thus began a bitter custody battle between the two women that has
captured national attention.24
Virginia laws prohibit its state courts from hearing custody
issues when proceedings concerning the case are already underway
in another state.25 Federal law presumably also would bar Virginia
from participating in the Miller-Jenkins dispute because the
Vermont court had already given Janet visitation rights.26 Federal
anti-kidnapping legislation guards against the very result seen in
the Miller-Jenkins dispute.27 The law seeks to prevent one parent
taking a child from one state to another, when custody proceedings
are already underway in one venue, in an attempt to garner more
favorable legal outcomes in a custody dispute under another state's
laws.28 This seemingly applicable law, however, was not applied by
the Virginia court in this instance.29 Instead, Lisa argued that
federal law does not prevent her suit from proceeding in Virginia,
citing the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act,3" because the Vermont
custody case had been heard under Vermont's civil union laws, which
are not recognized in Virginia." She argued, therefore, that the
Virginia law that prohibits recognizing civil unions likewise should
create "an exception" to the law prohibiting simultaneous custody
proceedings in both Virginia and another state. On August 24,
23. Id. at 232 (citing Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,
501 (1939).
24. Reports of the case have been made across both Virginia, e.g., Christina Nuckols, Two
Women, Two States, One Child, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Dec. 13, 2004, at Al, and
Vermont, e.g., Vt. Union Cited in Custody Battle, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Aug. 13, 2004, at
2. Reports also appeared in Washington, D.C., e.g., S. Mitra Kalita, Vt. Same-Sex Unions Null
in Va., Judge Rules, Case Seen as Test of Parental Rights, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at Bi;
Chicago, e.g., Judge to Rule on Custody of Gay Couple's Daughter, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2004,
at 9; Portland, e.g., Bill Graves, Election 2004 Gay Marriage Questions of Rights, Social Status
Stir Debate on Same-Sex Marriage, OREGONIAN, Oct. 8, 2004, at Al; Orlando, e.g., In Virginia,
Lesbian Fights Ruling Denying Her Custody, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 9, 2004, at A15;
Kansas City, e.g., Child Custody Case Puts States at Odds, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 9, 2004, at
9; Cincinnati, e.g., Justin Bergman, Custody Battle Could Test Law, CINCINNATI POST, Aug.
13, 2004, at A4; Boston, e.g., Civil Union Custody Case Dispute Continues, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 9,2004, at B2; and Memphis, Tennessee, e.g., Henry Bailey, Briefly, COM. APPEAL, Sept.
29, 2004, at A4.
25. Calvin R. Trice, It's Virginia vs. Vermont in Custody Case; Laws on Same-Sex Unions
Conflict in Former Lovers'Dispute, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 2004, at B2.
26. See Christina Nuckols, supra note 24. Nuckols references the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2005). Id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2005).
31. Nuckols, supra note 24.
32. Trice, supra note 25.
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2004, a Virginia judge agreed with Lisa's argument and held that
Lisa was entitled to full custody under Virginia law, which, according
to the judge, voids any claims of parental rights by Janet.3 The
Vermont judge handling the same case disagreed and has "ruled that
Virginia 'improperly exercised jurisdiction' in the case because the
matter was already pending in Vermont before a filing was made in
that state. 34
These conflicting rulings marked only the beginning of the dis-
pute over which states' laws should govern the parties involved in
the Miller-Jenkins case. In early September, a Vermont judge found
Lisa in contempt for attempting to circumvent the Vermont decision
and jurisdiction over the case. 35 The judge reprimanded Lisa for her
behavior, noting that:
[She] chose to bring her action initially in Vermont because of
the rights and benefits Vermont's law provide her.... But when
she realized that there were obligations and burdens to go along
with those rights and benefits, and decided that under the
specific order issued by the Vermont court the benefits were
outweighed by the burdens, she changed her mind and decided
to go elsewhere.36
Although this confusion and double-dealing would seem to be the
precise reason that the federal and state custody dispute laws exist,
Virginia's staunch refusal to assist in furthering rights for same-sex
families in any manner will lead to continued legal proceedings in
both states. This circumstance inevitably results in the crisis that
is currently unfolding for the Miller-Jenkins in the dispute over
Janet's parental rights. Both Vermont and Virginia have handed
down conflicting orders, and both parties have filed appeals to the
adverse decisions. 37 No one seems to agree which laws rightfully
apply to the Miller-Jenkins case.
The case drags on in these conditions with no end in sight.38
Meanwhile, Isabella is caught in the middle of a charged and tangled
33. Trice, supra note 11.
34. Lesbian Custody Dispute May Reach Vt. High Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan.
13, 2005, at B4.
35. Keays, supra note 8.
36. Id. (quoting Judge William Cohen's decision to grant Janet Miller-Jenkins's motion).
37. Alan J. Keays, Civil Union Case Goes to Vt. Supreme Court, RUTLAND HERALD, Jan.
29, 2005, available at http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20050129/
NEWS/501290336&S (reporting that Lisa Miller-Jenkins is appealing the Vermont decision
to the Vermont Supreme Court while Janet Miller-Jenkins simultaneously appeals the
Virginia decision to the Virginia Court of Appeals).
38. Id.
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custody battle that challenges traditional legal theory governing
parental rights, which arises because traditional theory does not
transfer well from the traditional view of parents as one mother and
one father to the increasingly complex reality of today's family
structures. This reality is apparent when a person can be simulta-
neously adjudicated to be a parent and a nonparent in different
jurisdictions. The circumstances of the Miller-Jenkins case exposes
some of the flaws in the present system.
Currently, growing numbers of gay and lesbian couples are
choosing to start families of their own.3 9 The growing number of
such nontraditional families will exacerbate the problem exposed by
the Miller-Jenkins case. The law and the current reality must align
themselves in order for those in Janet, Lisa, and Isabella Miller-
Jenkins's places to be treated fairly and consistently within the
legal system.
II. VERMONT LAW VERSUS VIRGINIA LAW
A. Vermont Law
Vermont has long been a pioneer of equal rights for homosexual
couples in the family law arena.4 ° Through both adoption and civil
union laws, the state has recognized the reality that not all children
are born or reared in a female-mother and male-father traditional
family unit.4 With this in mind, Vermont has set up legal avenues
that protect both biological and nonbiological parents.42 This approach
arguably offers better protection from the child's perspective as well,
since it ensures that the "law [is] available to help preserve a child's
important primary relationships, even if the child's parents were not
genetic parents and their marriage was not a formal one." 3 As family
units become more varied and complex, such laws become increas-
ingly necessary to safeguard all parties' rights and responsibilities in
39. See EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 87 (2004) (noting that in the 2000
national census, an estimated 180,000 of 600,000 American gay couples were raising
children). See also Dan Gilgoff, The Rise of the Gay Family, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., May
24, 2004 (noting that the 2000 census shows a substantial increase of gay and lesbian couples
raising children since the previous 1990 census).
40. Patricia Wen, A Civil Tradition: Data Show Same-Sex Unions in VTDraw a Privileged
Group, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2003, at B1.
41. Andrew Fegelman, State Court Says Gays Have Right to Adopt, CHI. TRIB., July 19,
1995, at Ni.
42. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(a) (2002).
43. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents'Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1747, 1858 (1993).
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child custody and visitation disputes. Vermont has responded to this
reality.
44
Prior to the State's civil union laws, Vermont provided an
avenue for nonbiological parents to attain legal parenthood through
adoption. 45 Statutory authorization allows for "any person, 46 to
adopt a child to create a legal parent-child relationship between the
two.4 7 Specifically speaking to the situation confronting gay and
lesbian couples planning to start a family, the Vermont law states:
"If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and
adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent
may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent's
parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this subsec-
tion. '4' This legal recourse directly applies to a biological parent's
lesbian or gay partner regarding children brought into the couple's
life, and it would allow such partners to establish equal parental
rights to the child.49
A Vermont court drew this precise conclusion in Tichenal v.
Dexter.5" A woman involved in a long-term lesbian relationship adopted
a daughter who was raised as the mutual daughter of both women.51
The other woman did not adopt the child and, when the relationship
dissolved, she petitioned the court for visitation rights pursuant to her
status as the child's second mother. 2 Granting the adoptive mother's
motion to dismiss, the court firmly stated that the non-adoptive
woman's opportunity to establish parental rights existed under
Vermont law through adoption, rather than through equitable petition
after the dissolution of the relationship.53 Speaking clearly to those
who may find themselves in the non-adoptive woman's position in the
future, the judge stated:
Persons affected by this decision can protect their interests.
Through marriage or adoption, heterosexual couples may assure
that nonbiological partners will be able to petition the court
regarding parental rights and responsibilities or parent-child
contact in the event a relationship ends. Nonbiological partners
44. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(a) (2002).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 1-102(b).
49. Id.
50. Tichenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997).
51. Id. at 683.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 686-87.
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in same-sex relationships can gain similar assurances through
adoption.5
4
As stated, Vermont adoption laws protect the rights of lesbians who
wish to establish their parental rights despite their nonbiological
parent status, and Vermont courts have spoken on the issue,
affirming that the law intends this protection.55 Even before the
1995 codification of parental rights attainable through adoption for
same-sex nonbiological parents, Vermont courts construed earlier,
more restrictive code language as granting parental status through
adoption to the lesbian partner of the biological parent.56
Vermont blazed a further path for homosexuals in the area of
parental rights with its passage of civil union laws in 1999."7 Under
Vermont law, a civil union is created when "two eligible persons have
established a relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive
the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
spouses."58 This definition suggests that the legislature intended to
create a marriage alternative for same-sex couples through which
they can receive legal status and rights equal to those obtained by
traditional male-female marriages. Various criteria must be met for
a couple's civil union certificate application to be approved: the
parties must be of the same sex,59 they must not be party to another
civil union or marriage, ° and they must comply with specific proce-
dural rules pertaining to the application for a civil union license."'
The civil union statutes also address the particular benefits, rights,
and obligations conferred on parties joined by a civil union.62 The
statute declares that:
(a) Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law
or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
marriage.
(b) A party to a civil union shall be included in any defini-
tion or use of the terms "spouse," "family," "immediate family,"
"dependent," "next of kin," and other terms that denote the
54. Id. at 686.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 1202.
60. Id.
61. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160 (2000).
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002).
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spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the
law.
(c) Parties to a civil union shall be responsible for the
support of one another to the same degree and in the same
manner as prescribed under law for married persons.
(d) The law of domestic relations, including annulment,
separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property
division and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union.
(f) The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a
child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term
of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple,
with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural
parent during the marriage.3
Upon dissolution, civil unions are again subjected to the same rules
governing dissolution as marriages under Vermont law.' This anal-
ysis demonstrates that the civil union laws fundamentally create a
situation analogous to marital status for same-sex couples, including
specifically analogous rules pertaining to children brought into the
civil union.
The foregoing laws provide an inclusive framework for resolu-
tion of the Miller-Jenkins dispute."5 The couple specifically sought
out Vermont law to solidify and govern their relationship.' Janet and
Lisa consciously decided to move to Vermont to apply for a civil union
certificate, which they received," thereby binding themselves legally
to one another and incurring the rights and responsibilities that
accompany this new legal status.' After becoming a legally recog-
nized couple, they consciously decided to start a family and settle in
Vermont in order to take advantage of the treatment and protection
Vermont law would afford them.69 Isabella was brought ,into their
family with the understanding that she was to be the legal daughter
63. Id. (emphasis added). Under Vermont law, the statute is interpreted to mean that both
the custodial and non-custodial parents enjoy certain rights, as well as incur certain respon-
sibilities, both pertaining to the child and to the other parent. Id. §§ 653-669.
64. Id. § 1206 (2002).
65. See supra notes 44-48.
66. Bergman, supra note 5.
67. Id.
68. Jonathan Finer, Court Says Both in Gay Union Are Parents, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
2004, at A3 (quoting Rutland, Va., Family Court Judge William D. Cohen writing "[P]arties
to a civil union who use artificial insemination to conceive a child can be treated no differently
than a husband and wife who ... choose to conceive ... with the sperm of an anonymous
donor").
69. Keays, supra note 8.
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of both mothers, as stipulated by the Vermont legislature. 7' The
visitation decision rendered by the family court of Vermont upon
the Miller-Jenkinses' dissolution of their civil union clearly shows
that the intended effect of the women's union, equal parental rights,
had been achieved. 71 These women sought out the protection
Vermont afforded same-sex couples wishing to legalize their unions,
and that protection was granted. Presumably because of the status
of Vermont's laws, Janet did not pursue the alternative method of
ensuring her legal rights regarding Isabella through adoption.72 She
should not be punished for failing to do so because her rights were
equally guaranteed under the state's civil union laws. Furthermore,
Lisa should not be given the opportunity to unilaterally default on
the agreement she made regarding her legal partnership with Janet
and the daughter they mutually agreed to have. The Vermont judge
involved in the Miller-Jenkins case realized these policy concerns
when he "ruled for the first time that both members of a same sex
civil union are the legal parents of a child born to one of them."73
The court's ruling embodied the natural, logical, and required result
under Vermont law.74
Janet and Lisa made decisions together regarding their status
as a family. Their decisions gained the sanctity of legally enforce-
able rights and obligations when they applied for and received a
certificate of civil union in Vermont.75 They expected Vermont law
to govern their relationship with each other and their relationships
to Isabella. Allowing one partner in these circumstances to shirk
responsibilities by moving to a new state and beginning legal
proceedings to which she knows she is not legally entitled is unjust.
It would be equally as unjust for a nonbiological mother in Janet's
position to demand release from the legal obligations she has
assumed as Isabella's mother, as it would be to allow a mother in
Lisa's position to demand and receive, under a different state's laws
than those rightfully governing her relationship, sole parental
rights regarding Isabella pursuant to her status as a biological
parent.
70. Bergman, supra note 5.
71. Keays, supra note 8.
72. Bergman, supra note 5.
73. Alan J. Keays, Landmark Ruling Made in Civil Union Custody Battle, RUTLAND
HERALD, Nov. 21,2004, available at http://www.rutlandherald.comapps/pbcs.dlYarticle?AID=
/20041121I/NEWS/411210342&S.
74. Id.
75. Legally enforceable rights and obligations are conferred pursuant to title 15, sections
1201-1207, of the Vermont Code.
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Strict categorizations of parent and nonparent relying on
biological affiliation to the child as the threshold and dispositive
inquiry do not address all family structures in today's diverse
society.76 A family law system that refuses to recognize a couple's
binding, contractual relationship spelling out mutual, equal rights
and obligations owed to their children, and instead strictly adheres
to a biologicallnonbiological distinction is manifestly unjust.
Allowing Lisa's action to effectuate a refusal to acknowledge and
grant Janet's deserved parental status, virtually guarantees
"exactly this scenario - parents fleeing with children from one
jurisdiction to another, because they don't like the custody rulings
of a state."7 7
B. Virginia Law
The Virgina legislature and courts, in contrast to Vermont's,
have chosen to abide by traditional legal theory in handling many
domestic issues.78 The state's preference for traditional law in this
area is especially evidenced by their treatment of marriage and
parental rights. Both issues show Virginia's adherence to a conven-
tional societal framework wherein families consist of a married man
and woman and their mutually, biologically conceived offspring.79
Statutes and court decisions implicating these matters demonstrate
that biology is indeed often the initial and sole question for disposi-
tion of such issues." Males may marry females, and children have
two parents, one male and one female."'
Although this construction certainly allows for efficient reso-
lution of marital and parental status questions, it does not provide
equal access to legal benefits or equal access to enforcement of legal
obligations in the context of family units that do not mirror such a
conventional makeup. Although traditional theories may make
sense for many traditional families, they simply do not translate
76. For evidence that family structures are changing, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
77. Alan J. Keays, Vt., Va. at Odds Over Child Custody Civil Union Law at Issue in Case
About Visitation, RUTLAND HERALD, Aug. 25, 2004 (quoting Rebecca Glenberg, an ACLU
attorney), available at http://www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040825/
NEWS/408250374/1024/NEWS04.
78. T. Shawn Taylor, Ties that Unwind: Legal Cases and Some State Laws Threaten to
Undo Lesbian Couples'Adoptions, Parental Agreements, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2004, at C1.
79. Peter Whorisky, A New Years Baby with an Additional Difference: Two Moms, WASH.
POST, Jan. 2, 2003, at Al.
80. Id.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2004).
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effectively to nontraditional families. Virginia law can cleave to
these traditional laws, but today's world shows that it will not follow
suit by constraining itself to such narrow boxes.
Under Virginia law, marriage between persons of the same sex
is prohibited. 3 Virginia also does not recognize any same-sex
marriage that takes place in another jurisdiction. 4 Recently, the
state expanded its prohibition on legalized same-sex partnerships
by passing the "Affirmation of Marriage Act."8 5 This act proclaims
that Virginia additionally will neither allow within its jurisdiction
a civil union between two men or two women nor recognize such a
union that has taken place under another state's laws.8" Virginia
parental status laws follow the traditional legal model whereby
biological parents are the only legal parents, unless adoption
procedures have been followed and parental status has been legally
determined. 7
Under Virginia law, the Miller-Jenkins case was efficiently
resolved under the Affirmation of Marriage Act; Virginia simply
declared Lisa the only mother that Isabella has and the only woman
who has a legal claim to parental rights to the girl based on her
biological connection to Isabella."8 Virginia's law sends the message
that Lisa's suit for sole custodial rights is appropriate, despite the
contrary rulings in Vermont under the laws applicable there to the
couple. 9 Because Lisa, the biological mother, seeks legal assurance
that she is the parent entitled to Isabella, and the adverse party
here is, from Virginia's viewpoint, a third-party nonbiological
outsider, Janet has no claim to the girl whatsoever and, therefore,
rightfully is excluded from the proceedings. °
Federal and state laws prohibiting Virginia's courts from
entertaining simultaneous custody petitions that are already
undertaken in another state9' pose something of a problem, but the
82. Whorisky, supra note 79.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2004).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 20-45.3.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 20-49.1.
88. Trice, supra note 11. See also Calvin R. Trice, Va. Woman Gets Sole Custody; Ex-
Lesbian Partner Wants Visitation Rights Under Vermont Law, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 29, 2004, at B4 (reporting that the Virginia judge "ruled ... that Virginia's new
Affirmation of Marriage Act prohibits state courts from recognizing civil unions and deemed
Lisa Miller-Jenkins the child's only parent").
89. Trice, supra note 11.
90. Id. (stating that the Virginia judge "deemed [Janet] no more than a friend").
91. See Upholding the Law, RUTLAND HERALD, Sept. 9, 2004, available at http://www.
rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040909/NEWS/409090339&S (noting
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courts, in response, have relied again on the Affirmation of Marriage
Act.92 Because Virginia does not recognize civil union laws of other
states, it is not precluded from deciding Lisa's petition because it
bears no obligation to consider proceedings taking place in Vermont
that are based on that state's civil union laws.93 Virginia's treatment
of this case is in line with other Virginia cases that evidence gay
stereotyping, a problem that arises in many states' laws and court
decisions.94
Virginia's treatment of the Miller-Jenkins case and others
shows that its concern is centered on ensuring biological parents'
rights, unless that biological parent places her child in a nontradi-
tional, homosexual family unit. This insistence on biological rights
is little more than a mechanism for discouraging a lifestyle that the
State's official laws do not condone. The focus on biology alone
hardly suffices to dictate family affairs that have already been
determined in the appropriate sphere - the family itself, formed
according to the parties' own autonomous decisions.95
Virginia's concern for biological parents' rights would not be
eroded by a departure from its traditional legal framework. Here,
for example, Isabella's biological mother is well-protected under
Vermont's progressive law; Lisa was granted custody of her child
and, if she were to request it, is entitled to financial support from
Isabella's other parent, Janet.96 Vermont law only restricts Lisa by
holding her to the legal obligations she also incurred by consciously
deciding to form her family, thereby giving her the freedom to make
autonomous family choices with the assurance that they will be
respected by the law. By ignoring the Vermont proceeding, Virginia
law protects Lisa from her own choices, allowing her to circumvent
her decisions and permitting her to take advantage of narrow,
specifically that although Virginia's law refusing to recognize civil unions from other states
may be a legitimate exercise of that state's legislature, that law "does not outweigh the law
that requires states to recognize the jurisdiction of other states in parental disputes").
92. ACL UFiles Appeal in Gay Custody Battle, RUTLAND HERALD, Dec. 9,2004, http://www.
rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dl/article?AID=/20041209/NEWS/412090419&S.
93. Trice, supra note 11.
94. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (awarding a grandmother custody
of a child instead of the child's mother). The court based its opinion in part on its finding that
the mother's homosexuality was "illegal" and "immoral," which it found to contribute to the
mother's "unfitness" and thus to validate a disregard for the court's usual deference to
biological parents' rights. Id. at 107. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The
Lesbian Mother and the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 341 (1995).
95. Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parenthood, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 639-40 (2002).
96. The responsibility to pay child support arises under title 15, section 1204(d) of the
Vermont Code. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(d) (2002).
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arbitrary laws she initially rejected when they did not support her
desires at that time.
III. LEGAL MODELS FOR CUSTODIAL RIGHTS
This section describes current legal models that are used by
courts hearing child custody and related matters. Some of these
models reflect the legal avenues taken by the states discussed in the
previous section as seen in their statutory and case law, while others
offer other visions of how legal parental issues might be decided.
The traditional, parent/nonparent model is analyzed, followed by
various other 'functional parent' models used by some courts to deal
with the complexities of nontraditional families. Among 'functional
parent' models are equitable parenthood, de facto parenthood, in loco
parentis, and equitable estoppel. Although no separate category
exists for a 'best interests of the child' test to determine parental
rights issues, the child's interest is always a factor in parental
establishment proceedings, as can be seen in the following discussion.
A. Traditional Model: Parent Versus Nonparent
Legally, upon the birth of a child, the law demands a determi-
nation of the identity of the child's parents, within the underlying
framework that each child has exactly one mother and one father.97
A determination of legal parentage is also a determination of the
rights and responsibilities of parenting the child to the exclusion of all
others.98 This embodiment of the parent versus nonparent ideology
can be explained as follows: 'legal parenthood is an all-or-nothing
status. A parent has all of the obligations of parenthood and all of
the rights; a nonparent has none of the obligations and none of the
rights."99 A designated parent can expect to prevail in a contest with
a nonparent involving the child, short of the parent's gross inade-
quacy of caretaking. °° A person may be deemed a legal parent only
97. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (2004) (stating that the act of giving birth is prima
facie proof of parent status as well as describing other ways to establish parentage).
98. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 468.
99. Id. at 471.
100. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual
Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 841, 846-47 (1997). This article states:
It is extremely difficult for a nonparent to wrest custody away from a parent.
Because the nonparent "bears a heavy burden of persuasion," it may not even
suffice to establish that the parent intentionally abused or neglected the child.
[ . . Third parties must prove parental unfitness or other very unusual
conditions to wrest custody away from the parents.... The New York Court of
Appeals spelled out what some of those unusual conditions might be, explaining
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if he or she is biologically related to the child," 1 married to a woman
giving birth to a child,0 2 or legally adopts the child according to the
relevant state law. 
103
In a court proceeding to determine a child's future arrange-
ments when a couple separates:
The significance of parental status.., is profound. In a custody
dispute, parents stand on equal footing with respect to one
another, and the court determines custody under a best interests
of the child standard. When the dispute is between a parent and
a nonparent, not only is the parent usually considered the
preferred custodian, but the nonparent may even be found
without standing to challenge parental custody. 4
This biology-centered, nonparent-exclusion model has obvious
implications for the growing number of family units that share the
characteristics of the Miller-Jenkins family. Because Lisa is the
female parent of Isabella, the court can dispose of the custody
proceeding with little fanfare. Under the traditional legal model,
Lisa has all the rights and responsibilities of Isabella's upbringing,
while Janet, a nonparent, has no legal recourse for the visitation
rights she seeks. Logically, under this model, Janet, who was
involved in Isabella's life from the very plan of her conception, has
that a state may terminate parental rights "if there is first a judicial finding of
surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortunate or
involuntary extended disruption of custody, or other equivalent but rare
extraordinary circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare of the
child."
Id. (footnotes omitted). In one case, termination of parental rights was deemed appropriate
because neglect would be ongoing for a long or indefinite period. In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274,
278 (Minn. 1986).
101. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 468-69 (noting that a single, biological mother's desire to be
deemed a child's only parent is of"no legal consequence" because she is required to submit the
biological father's name and remains "vulnerable to a paternity claim even if the child was
born as a result of alternative insemination").
102. Id. at 469-70 (discussing the already apparent difficulties with the biological
parenthood model, arising from the legal presumption that the mother's husband is the child's
father, which hinder a biological father in gaining parental rights when the mother is already
married to another man).
103. Id. at 483. Even adoption is riddled with the legal model that limits a child's parents
to two, and only one of each sex. For example:
[A] stepparent cannot adopt a child if the child has a living parent of the same
sex as the stepparent and that parent does not consent to termination of his or
her parental status. This concept interferes with the ability of a child in a
lesbian-mother family to acquire two legally recognized mothers through
adoption by the second mother.
Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 471-72.
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no standing to bring even a visitation claim in court, while a sperm
donor could bring such a claim and probably be granted rights and
responsibilities equal to Lisa's pursuant to his status as the
father. °5 This unfair result, from the point of view of Isabella's
functional family, is the logical conclusion of an out-dated model,
which clings to the idea that a child has exactly two parents and
exactly one of each sex.
B. Functional Parenthood Models
1. Equitable Parenthood
A legal model based on three factors has developed that allows
a legal nonparent to gain parental rights and responsibilities."°6 The
factors of equitable parenthood are: (1) mutual acknowledgment of
a parent-child relationship between the child and the nonparent, or
cooperation by the parent in such relationship's development over
a period of time prior to separation; (2) the nonparent's desire for
parental rights regarding the child; and (3) the nonparent's
willingness to pay child support." 7 It is helpful to see how this
theory plays out in practice by examining some cases invoking the
doctrine.
In the case creating the equitable parenthood concept, a
divorced father sought parental rights to a child who was found not
to be his biological son but who had been born during his marriage
to the child's mother.08 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court decision awarding sole custodial rights and responsibili-
ties to the mother. The lower court found that the divorced husband
was not the father and, therefore, had no claim to the child.0 9 The
appellate court stated that the ex-husband was entitled to consider-
ation as the child's parent based on the factors outlined above.110
Interestingly, the court did not rely on the presumption that is often
used in these cases, which allows a man in this situation to be given
parental status pursuant to his marriage to the mother when the
child was born.111 Instead, the court deemed the ex-husband an
105. In fact, some case law does support this logical conclusion. See, e.g., C.M. v. C.C., 377
A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
106. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 484-85.
107. Id. (citing Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), in which
the doctrine arose).
108. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 519-20.
111. Id. at 517-19.
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equitable parent because of the functional parent-child relationship
in existence as demonstrated by application of the equitable
factors. 112 The court noted that the ex-husband had assumed the
status of father upon the child's birth and had established a strong
parental relationship with the child over the next ten years,
satisfying factor one, the mutual acknowledgment factor. 113 This
factor would also be met because the mother had allowed such a
perceived parent-child relationship to develop." 4 In fact, the court
noted, the mother raised the issue of the husband's non-paternity
status only during the divorce proceeding, surprising both the
husband and the child." 5 Factor two, the desire for rights factor,
was met by the fact that the husband was proceeding with the
action to obtain legal right to the child and by his wish to pursue the
parental relationship." 6 To satisfy factor three, although not
specifically mentioned, the ex-husband presumably was willing to
assume the financial obligations of paternity or had already entered
into a child support agreement."7 One scholar notes that this
holding easily could be limited to marital situations, excluding its
application to a separating homosexual couple's custody dispute." '
The author notes, however, that this result would be illogical:
[T]he underlying rationale for the equitable parenthood doctrine
does not depend upon the parties' marriage. Two of the three
prongs of the test enunciated in Atkinson would presumably
apply in a lesbian-mother family: the nonbiological mother's
desire for the rights of parenthood and her willingness to pay
child support. The first prong of the test, which requires either
the mutual acknowledgment of a parent-child relationship or the
biological parent's cooperation in the development of such a
relationship, can be easily adapted from a marital situation to a
nonmarital one. If the nonbiological mother in a lesbian-mother
family satisfies the relationship prong of the Atkinson test, she
is no less a parent than was the husband in Atkinson."9
In fact, one Florida case supports this very result in the lesbian
nonbiological parent context. 20 Kristen Pearlman was born to Joan
112. Id. at 519-20.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 519.
118. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 485.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 486 (citing In re Pearlman, No. 87-24,926 DA, slip op. at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31,
1989)).
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and Janine Pearlman, though she was only the biological daughter
of Joan.12' When Joan died, Kristen was approximately six years
old, and Janine began winding her way through the legal system to
gain custody of her daughter.'22 Joan's parents had previously
authorized Janine to care for Kristen, but to Janine's surprise they
also attempted to gain custody of the girl, which they were eventu-
ally awarded.'23 Janine was granted visitation rights, but they were
subsequently terminated when the grandparents legally adopted
Kristen.2 4 Janine found herself back in court fighting the decision,
and this time the reality of the situation prevailed, as the court
recognized that Janine and Joan had created a family unit with
Kristen as their mutual daughter.'25 The court recognized Janine as
the equitable parent of Kristen and awarded her physical and legal
custody, noting:
Based upon the length and nature of the child's relationship
with [Janine] and [Janine's] with her, including [Janine's] de
facto parent status during the first seven years of the child's life,
the powers afforded [Janine] with regard to Kristen under the
power of attorney initially given by the Pearlmans, [Janine's]
awarded visitation rights with the child and ... the fact that
[she] was and remains Kristen's primary psychological and
equitable parent, the Court finds that [their] relationship was in
all material respects a family relationship and in fact, if not in
law, the equivalent of a parent-child relationship.'26
The court further noted that Janine's constitutional rights had
been violated by the Pearlmans' legal actions, due to her equitable
parenthood status arising from the relationship between them.'27
The court elaborated:
[T]he relationship had begun with the consent of Kristen's
natural mother and continued, at least temporarily after the
natural mother's death .... [Janine] had a fundamental liberty
interest in preserving her family relationship with the [sic]
Kristen .... Likewise, Kristen had a constitutionally protected
interest in preserving her family relationship with [Janine] ...
It is not the exact 'type' of relationship but rather the 'nature' of
121. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 529.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Pearlman, slip op. at 3-4).
127. Id. at 530 (quoting Pearlman, slip op. at 8).
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the relationship that determines whether one's interests are
sufficient.128
The court placed emphasis on the detriment to Kristen were she to
remain with the Pearlmans rather than Janine, discussing Kristen's
continued identification of Janine as her "primary parent figure[,]
her strong preference for living with [Janine,] and her dislike of
living with the Pearlmans."'29 Although the court in this case
identified Janine by several functional parenthood status titles,
including de facto parent and equitable parent,13 ° the court appar-
ently acknowledged the reality of the relationship between Janine
and Kristen in terms of the equitable parenthood factors outlined in
Atkinson. 3' The court repeatedly based its decision on the parent-
child relationship existing between the parties and recognized by
them, and to which the child's biological mother had consented,
satisfying the first prong of the Atkinson test.'32 The court autho-
rized the equitable relationship to continue existing as it had before,
with Janine maintaining both the rights and responsibilities of legal
parenthood as she desired, in satisfaction of prongs two and three.'33
As seen in the Pearlman case, equitable parenthood allows the
reality of a child's family unit to determine whether or not a person
should be given status equivalent to a 'true' parent.'34 The Pearlman
model logically can be applied to both heterosexual and homosexual
couples who do not fit the 'traditional' nuclear family unit. Although
the equitable parenthood model does not confer the formal label of
'parent' that is conferred on the biological parent, it does afford the
equitable parent the same legal consideration as the traditional
parent."3 5 The doctrine goes a long way toward better serving the
interests of the child and the functional parent because it focuses in
particular on the emotional and psychological connection between
them. '3 The equitable parenthood model looks at whether the child
and equitable parent developed a psychological relationship equiva-
lent to that of a child and traditional parent, whether they have acted
and treated one another as such, and whether the equitable parent
shows willingness to assume the obligations as well as the benefits
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id. at 531.
131. Id. at 529-31.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 529-30.
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., id.
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afforded those with parental status.3 ' All of these factors determine
whether a child-parent relationship exists in fact, despite the legal
system's failure to recognize it. In the Miller-Jenkins case, the equi-
table parenthood factors would result in Janet's equitable parent
status since all three factors are met.
2. In Loco Parentis
This functional parenthood theory, like that of equitable
estoppel, 3 ' arose primarily to impose financial responsibility on
legal nonparents but has been extended to allow a parent-child
relationship to continue despite the nonparent's lack of legal right
to claim the child.'39 Unlike the focus in the equitable parenthood
doctrine, which is the psychological and emotional bond between the
nonparent and the child, the in loco parentis doctrine focuses on the
intent of the nonparent only. 140 The doctrine "creates parental rights
and responsibilities in one who voluntarily provides support or takes
over custodial duties,"'' requiring a court to determine the func-
tional parent's mindset regarding the child as evidenced by concrete
support, such as monetary assistance.4 Legal proceedings involving
this doctrine must answer the question of whether or not the
nonparent meant to step into the role of parent, which justifies
finding in loco parentis status and imposing or granting parental
responsibilities or rights.'43
When extending the in loco parentis doctrine to maintain rela-
tionships between functional parents and their children, courts have
most often granted functional parents visitation rights.'44 Parental
rights have mostly been granted in the context of a stepparent as
the functional parent, 145 and courts may be unwilling to apply it in
the context of a homosexual functional parent. An extension to that
situation would depend on how narrowly courts choose to construe
137. Elizabeth A. Delaney, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing
the Relationship Between the Non-Biological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
177, 202 (1991).
138. See supra notes 106-37.
139. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 502.
140. Id.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See State ex rel. Williams v. Juvenile Court, 204 N.W. 21, 25 (Minn. 1924) (explaining
use of objective evidence to determine third party's intention to parent), cited in Strasser,
supra note 100, at 846 n.34.
143. Id.
144. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 502-04.
145. Id.
TWO MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD
the case law, and it would be easy for a court to deny its applicabil-
ity to a gay couple's situation by distinguishing it on grounds that
stepparents gained rights in part due to their marital status to the
child's legal parent. One court's rationale for granting visitation
rights to a stepparent, however, supports a broader definition of
awarding rights based on this theory:
[W]e do not intend to open the door to a myriad of unrelated
third persons who happen to feel affection for a child. Nor do we
intend to diminish the rights of the natural parent concerning
his or her minor children. Our decision is explicitly limited to the
factual situation before us, where the party seeking visitation is
claiming he has acted in a parental capacity. The factual dispute
as to the question of the intent of a person to assume the status
of a parent is only preliminary; the determinative question
remains as to what is in the best interests of the child.146
This language certainly can be used to argue in favor of granting
rights to a functional parent like Janet Miller-Jenkins. She is
certainly more than an "unrelated third person[] who happen[s] to
feel affection for"'47 Isabella. Rather, she proceeds on her claim by
the strength of the fact that she entered Isabella's life at its very
beginning and has "acted in a parental capacity." '148 Her intent to do
so is apparent and was apparent from the beginning. Furthermore,
it can be argued that Janet is not seeking to "diminish the rights of
the natural parent,"'49 but is instead seeking to gain visitation
rights to maintain a relationship with Isabella, a relationship that
both relevant parties intentionally began and acted on, including
the natural parent in this case. Therefore, this doctrine could
feasibly support a finding of Janet's parental status.
Some strengths of the in loco parentis doctrine support such a
finding. These include the characteristics that:
[T]he legally recognized parent does not have the power to
terminate the relationship[,] ... [and] that in loco parentis is a
non-exclusive status. There is no arbitrary limit on the gender
or number of people who may stand in loco parentis for a child.
The rights and responsibilities of parenthood under this doctrine
146. Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 n.5 (Alaska 1982).
147. Id.
148. Carter, 644 P.2d at 855 n.5.
149. Id.
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are based on the reality of who intentionally fulfills the
parenting function, not on the one-mother/one-father model. 5°
As the intent of the legal parent is ignored under this model,
courts may be unwilling to apply it due to the emphasis so often
placed on protecting the biological or legal parent's rights.'5 '
3. De Facto Parenthood
The doctrine of de facto parenthood "focuses solely on the
psychological bond between the [functional parent] and the child' ' 2
and is largely analogous to the doctrine of equitable parenthood.'
53
One author characterizes the distinction as one of usefulness: while
equitable parenthood grants parental rights to functional parents,
de facto parenthood allows a functional parent to have standing to
make a claim,' but refuses to acknowledge the functional parent
as a 'parent', and does not award custody or other rights "unless an
award to a [legal] parent would be detrimental to the child."'55 Thus,
the de facto parent has access to the courts but may face insur-
mountable difficulty in attaining any actual parental rights. The
distinction maintained between the traditional parent and a
functional parent refuses to allow a functional parent equal status.
This model is particularly harmful and illogical when the reality of
the situation does not warrant the outdated division, as in situ-
ations like that of the Miller-Jenkinses. Obviously, this aspect of the
de facto parenthood model poses serious limitations for its use in the
homosexual family context. A nonparent will only win a case for
parental recognition in the limited circumstances where the child's
legally recognized parent is so unfit as to be "detrimental to the
child."'56 Because circumstances must be extreme before the de facto
parenthood model operates to recognize a nonparent, it seems to be
of little substantial use for preserving the rights of the nonbiological
parent in a separating gay couple's custodial dispute.
The de facto parenthood model has also been interpreted,
however, to allow more substantial remedies to flow from a finding
of de facto parenthood. 157 The Maine Supreme Court addressed this
150. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 507.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 510.
153. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
154. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 510.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004).
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issue in C.E. W. v. D.E. W.5 In that case, a lesbian couple conceived
a child through artificial insemination.159 D.E.W., the biological
mother, and C.E.W., the functional mother, made certain legal
decisions to cement their status as a legal family unit with equal
rights regarding the child.16° They changed their last names to
ensure all three would have the same name and signed two
parenting agreements, which detailed that both parents would
share rights and responsibilities regarding the child. 6' One
agreement was signed just after the child's birth, and the other was
signed after the couple separated.'62 The two women did in fact
share the decision-making and contact with the child as "expected
of loving and involved parents.'' 6 ' At the time of suit, the child was
nine years old and "ha[d] bonded with C.E.W. as his parent....
[T]he child [was] both happy and healthy."'" When C.E.W. brought
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to
parental rights and responsibilities, D.E.W. did not contest C.E.W.'s
status as a de facto parent but, instead, wished to limit the remedy
granted to C.E.W. on account of that status.'65 First, she claimed
that de facto parenthood does not entitle a nonbiological parent to
parental rights unless a legal parent relinquishes her own rights or
there is a claim that the legal parent places the child in jeopardy.'66
Second, she claimed that even if these rights might be awarded by
a court, the most a de facto parent is entitled to are rights of contact,
or visitation rights.'67
The Maine Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in
favor of C.E.W., declaring that, under prior state case law interpret-
ing statutory provisions speaking to a court's power to award such
remedies, "as a corollary of a court's equitable jurisdiction to
determine a child's best interest and award parental rights and
responsibilities, it may, in limited circumstances, entertain an
award of parental rights and responsibilities to a de facto parent."'68
Here, "D.E.W. concedes that C.E.W. is the child's de facto parent,
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1147.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1147-48.
166. Id. at 1148-49. The court noted that the issue of jeopardy to the child had been
addressed by the lower court, whose decision included finding that the child's exclusion from
C.E.W.'s life would itself constitute jeopardy. Id. at 1149 n.6.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1150-51.
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has accepted C.E.W.'s parental role in two written agreements, and
has not challenged ... the court's conclusion that C.E.W. is the
child's de facto parent."'69 The remedy granted by the lower court
was upheld, and C.E.W. was awarded a declaration of actual, equal
parental rights and responsibilities, rather than visitation rights
only, on the basis of her de facto parenthood status.17' This case is
of limited value in answering the threshold question of what
precisely the standard is for a determination of de facto parenthood.
The court specifically declined to define the term,'7' noting only that
"[h]owever this term is defined as it is fleshed out by the Legislature
or courts in the future, it must surely be limited to those adults who
have fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal,
committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life.' 72
Currently, the definition of the doctrine remains broad and, in
many cases, of very limited remedial potential. For example, Janet
Miller-Jenkins would probably be able to establish that she has
formed a psychological bond with Isabella during the child's
formative years, allowing Janet to bring her claim before the court.
Depending on the strictness with which the court applied the
doctrine, her success thereafter is highly questionable. Because no
allegation has been made that Lisa is an unfit parent who will be
detrimental to Isabella, de facto parenthood would not operate to
grant parenthood to Janet. If, however, the court were to give more
emphasis to the clear legal undertaking of equal parental status by
both women through their use of Vermont law, Janet might prevail
in a manner similar to C.E.W.
C. Equitable Estoppel Applied to Parental Rights Context
Courts have occasionally borrowed from the contract doctrine of
equitable estoppel either to compel a nonbiological, unrecognized
parent to support a child financially'73 or to allow such a parent the
right to continue the already established parent-child relationship. 174
Use of this doctrine in the context of a parental rights dispute
depends on the traditional requirements of the doctrine being met;
there must be "(1) action or non-action which induces (2) reliance by
another (3) to his detriment."'175 Reliance depends upon what the
169. Id. at 1151.
170. Id. at 1152.
171. Id. at 1151-52.
172. Id. at 1152.
173. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 491.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting In re Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Wis. 1987)).
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actions of the legal parent might lead the nonparent to reasonably
believe, and the detriment incurred may be either financial or
emotional.'76
Because this application focuses on what the suing party might
reasonably have believed based on the nature of the couple's
relationship with each other and with the child, it lends itself to the
situation of separating lesbian partners with children. The doctrine
is especially applicable when the nonbiological parent "believe [s she
is a] legal parent[] or because [the partners] have a co-parenting
agreement." '177 Since "[t]he claim is based in part on the conduct or
assurances of the child's [biological] parent, who has encouraged the
[nonbiological parent] to assume the parental role[, a] prime
example is the partner of a gay parent, who together with that
parent decided to establish a family."'78 Estoppel often arises in
these types of relationships because, as in the case of the Miller-
Jenkins, the lesbian or gay couple consciously chooses to bring a
child into the relationship to be raised together by the partners as
mutual parents, giving rise to a reasonable belief of parental rights
and responsibilities for both partners.'79 Factors commonly evident
in these homosexual family units often invite reliance: actions leading
to reliance on a belief of parental status; an explicit written agree-
ment between the two mothers or two fathers stating that such
parental status is mutual; an explicit oral agreement to the same
effect; or similar implicit agreements between the two parents.
' 80
"Functional parents [who evidence these factors] . .. should be per-
mitted to assert that by creating the parent-child relationship and
representing that child rearing was a joint endeavor, the legally
recognized [parent] has been estopped from denying the functional
parent the status of legal parent."''
In addition to the legal parent's actions inducing reliance on the
part of the legally unrecognized parent, reliance may also be evident
from the child's perspective.8 2 "In the case of either childbearing or
adoption, the child relies upon the legally recognized mother's
actions in developing a parent-child relationship with the legally
unrecognized mother. Estoppel is therefore appropriate to preserve
176. See generally, id. at 492-500.
177. Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1071, 1096 (2003).
178. Id.
179. See Polikoff, supra note 3, at 499 (stating that equitable estoppel may be used where
"child rearing was a joint endeavor").
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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the child's identity as the daughter of both her parents. 18 3 One
author, examining cases that have found child support owed by a
technical nonparent under the equitable estoppel doctrine,8 4 notes
that the common factor is that "these cases support the proposition
that courts will enforce the parental obligation of support if the
child would not have entered the family but for the actions of the
'non-parent."185 A notable strength of this estoppel doctrine is that
its focus on the intent of the legal parent, as seen through her
actions, allows her parental autonomy to remain intact.' "A person
cannot inadvertently achieve parental rights under equitable estop-
pel[, r]ather, a legally recognized parent must create the factual
circumstances in which the additional parent-child relationship
develops."'87 Thus, the estoppel doctrine simply works to respect the
outcome of the decisions made by the legal parent when forming
her family with her partner in the first place. 88 A significant weak-
ness, however, is that the doctrine applies only to relief sought in
specific petitions, rather than establishing a solid, overarching legal
parenthood for the nonbiological individual.8 9
Taking the requirements of the estoppel doctrine into consider-
ation, the Miller-Jenkins case would come out in favor of Janet, the
nonbiological mother. Lisa and Janet entered into a civil union'9 °
whereby both parents were afforded equal parenting rights
regardless of their biological relationship to a child brought into the
family.' 9 ' Isabella subsequently became their mutual daughter.'92 In
addition to the contractual nature of the union, which itself is
evidence of action inducing a reasonable belief by Janet that she
would be entitled to parental status regarding Isabella, the couple
endeavored to ensure that the child would look like both mothers by
selecting characteristics of the sperm donor resembling Janet, to
make up for her lack of biological participation in the child's
conception. 9 ' The women were equally involved with the parenting
until the union dissolved."
183. Id. at 500.
184. Id. at 492-94.
185. Id. at 493.
186. Id. at 501-02.
187. Id. at 502.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 501.
190. Bergman, supra note 5.
191. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (2002).
192. Bergman, supra note 5.
193. Id.
194. Id.
TWO MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD
After the relationship's dissolution, Lisa's behavior further
reinforced Janet's reliance on her own parental status. The couple
sought adjudication of their custody and visitation claims in the
Vermont family court. 9 ' Because Vermont law recognizes the rights
due to Janet,196 presumably, Lisa could invoke Vermont law to
recognize the responsibilities owed by Janet, if Lisa needed help
enforcing them. That Lisa's actions induced Janet's reliance
satisfies the reliance element. The element of detriment is also
satisfied, since severing the relationship between Janet and Isabella
would result in emotional detriment to both of them.'97 An equitable
estoppel theory, therefore, would result in a finding for Janet in this
case. As noted above, because this doctrine offers relief only in
specific types of litigation, Janet's rights and Isabella's welfare
would not be adequately protected for the future.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has firmly held that, in
family life, individuals should be allowed to direct their families'
own destinies and that prejudice is not a valid reason for disallow-
ing that autonomy.1 9 In the case of lesbian parents such as Janet
and Lisa Miller-Jenkins, the lingering and powerful prejudice
against gay parents has enabled Lisa to sidestep the legal relation-
ship she undertook with Janet regarding Isabella, which allowed
them to do precisely what they wanted when their relationship was
intact: direct their family's destiny, enabling each woman to obtain
and maintain equal parental status regarding the daughter they
consciously decided to bring into the world. This prejudice does not
adequately justify a system that denies nonbiological parents' rights
in situations of functional parenthood. The real findings available
on the psychological adjustment of children raised by lesbian
mothers demonstrate that the worries proclaimed by anti-gay
activists regarding maladjustment by these children is misplaced. '99
When two competent individuals enter into a decision to start a
family and go through the legal processes to ensure that both of them
will be considered equal parents to a child under the law, that
decision should be binding. Both parents would be protected regard-
ing their own rights to the child and each other's responsibilities owed
195. Id.
196. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1204 (2002).
197. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 492-500.
198. See generally, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
199. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 561-67. See also WOLFSON, supra note 39, 88-95.
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to the child, in the event that the relationship dissolves. This ideal
also best protects the child's own relationships with both of her
functional parents. Lisa and Janet went through these processes
and bound themselves through an agreement that defined their
relationship with Isabella even after they formally dissolved their
civil union. Only when Lisa decided that she desired to breach her
agreements with Isabella's other mother did she decide to avail
herself of another state's discriminatory laws to achieve her goal.
Virginia's laws quickly and easily provided her with what she
wanted, sole custody of Isabella. °° This scenario raises an important
legal issue as to what happens when legal proceedings concerning
a single child take place in multiple states whose courts apply
diametrically different laws and reach opposing outcomes. This
issue is likely to come up again and again in the future, until such
discrimination against gay parents is rooted out. As the Miller-
Jenkins case shows, what happens is a tragedy for the legal, though
nonbiological, parent and the child. Even if this case is eventually
resolved as it should be, ensuring visitation and other parental
rights to Janet as she requests, the time spent in these proceedings
will have already produced a great deal of financial loss for Janet
and emotional turmoil for both Janet and Isabella.
As this note has explored, the law in the United States leaves
much room for improvement in recognizing functional families.
While Virginia strictly adheres to a 'traditional' one mother and one
father model, based on a biological link, other states recognize the
potential for functional parenthood to better serve the needs of the
parties seeking recognition of a parent-child relationship. While
these models, too, embody shortcomings in granting parental status
to nonbiological parents in homosexual relationships, they at the
very least represent progress.
The Miller-Jenkins case makes the shortcomings of the
traditional model acutely obvious. Their case clearly represents one
where their daughter Isabella would not have been brought into
existence but for the understanding, agreement, and mutual desires
of Lisa and Janet. Virginia's refusal to recognize Janet as a parent
is manifestly unjust and allows a person in Lisa's position to abuse
the legal system. Family structures vary so greatly from the
traditional model that Virginia's staunch refusal to acknowledge
these structures rises to a level of reprehensibility.
Vermont is an excellent example that change, even if slow and
steady, is good. The results of this change in family recognition,
despite meeting opposition, are satisfying:
200. Keays, supra note 8.
TWO MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILD
Increasingly in recent years, lawmakers have recognized the
claims of non-parents to custody or visitation over the objections
of parents. To some extent this trend simply expresses increased
dissatisfaction with the traditional idea that parental rights
exist on the basis of biology alone; it recognizes that functional
parents may deserve parental status and authority.... These
reforms recognize that, because of the complexity of modern
family structure, children form true parent-child bonds with
care-taking adults other than their biological parents.0 1
Still, the process is far from complete. The Miller-Jenkins case
vividly illustrates the difficulties that are created by conflicting
state laws. °2 Until all states recognize that nonbiological homosex-
ual parents are entitled to the same rights as their biological
counterparts, the status of these parents will remain tragically
uncertain as they work their way through an equally uncertain
judicial system.
RACHEL E. SHOAF*
201. Scott, supra note 177, at 1094-95.
202. A Question of Dignity, supra note 15. The article notes that:
It is impossible to say how the varying state-by-state conflicts will be resolved
in courts around the country, but it is clear the states that refuse to recognize
the rights of gay and lesbian couples are seeking to perpetuate an era when the
legal system that was supposed to be serving us all instead subjected gays and
lesbians to the indignities of second-class citizenship.
* J.D. Candidate 2006, William and Mary School of Law; B.A. English 2001, Mary
Baldwin College, magna cum laude. The author would like to thank Melanie Jacobs for her
guidance in developing the topic for this piece and her family for their constant support and
encouragement.
2005] 295
